How can di¤erent individuals'probability functions on a given -algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense …rst to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize this idea by introducing a 'premise-based'approach to probabilistic opinion pooling, and show that, under a variety of assumptions, it leads to linear or neutral opinion pooling on the 'premises'.
Introduction
Suppose each individual member of some group (expert panel, court, jury etc.) assigns probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a corresponding collective probability assignment? Classically, this problem has been modelled as the aggregation of probability functions, which are de…ned on some -algebra of events, a set of events that is closed Although both authors are jointly responsible for this paper and project, Christian List wishes to note that Franz Dietrich should be considered the lead author, to whom the credit for the present mathematical proofs is due. This paper is the second of two self-contained, but technically related companion papers inspired by binary judgment-aggregation theory. Both papers build on our earlier, unpublished paper 'Opinion pooling on general agendas' (September 2007). under negation and countable disjunction, and by implication also countable conjunction. Each individual submits a probability function on the given -algebra, and these probability functions are then aggregated into a single collective probability function on it.
1 One of the best-known solutions to this aggregation problem is linear pooling, where the collective probability function is a linear average of the individual probability functions. Linear pooling has several salient properties. First, if all individuals unanimously assign probability 1 (or probability 0) to some event, this probability assignment is preserved collectively ('consensus preservation'). Second, the collective probability for each event depends only on individual probabilities for that event ('event-wise independence'). And third, all events are treated equally: the pattern of dependence between individual and collective probability assignments is the same for all events ('neutrality').
In many practical applications, however, not all events are equal. In particular, the events in a -algebra may fall into two categories (whose boundaries may be drawn in di¤erent ways). On the one hand, there are events that correspond to intuitively basic propositions, such as 'it will rain', 'it will be humid', or 'atmospheric CO 2 causes global warming'. On the other hand, there are events that are intuitively non-basic. These are 'constructible' by combining basic events, for instance via disjunction (union) of basic events, conjunction (intersection), or negation (complementation). It is not obvious that when we aggregate probabilities, basic and non-basic events should be treated alike.
For a start, in reasoning about a given set of events, we may conceptualize basic and non-basic events di¤erently. We may conceptualize non-basic events as combinations of basic events, just as we form composite propositions by combining atomic propositions. Second, the way in which we assign probabilities to non-basic events is likely to di¤er from the way in which we assign probabilities to basic events. When we assign a probability to some non-basic event, say a conjunction or disjunction of basic events, this typically presupposes the assignment of probabilities to the underlying basic events. For example, the natural way to assign a probability to the disjunctive event 'rain or heat'is to ask what the probability of rain is, what the probability of heat is, and whether the two are correlated.
2 If this is correct, the natural method of making probabilistic judgments is to consider basic events …rst and to consider non-basic events next. Basic events serve as 'premises': we …rst assign probabilities to them, and then let these probability assignments constrain our probability assignments to other, non-basic events.
In this paper, we propose an approach to probability aggregation that captures this idea: the premise-based approach. Under this approach, the group …rst assigns collective probabilities to all basic events (the 'premises') by aggregating the individiduals' probabilities for them; and then it assigns probabilities to all other events, constrained by the probabilities of the basic events. If the basic events are, for instance, 'rain'and 'heat', then, in a …rst step, the collective probabilities for these two events are determined by aggregating the individual probabilities for them. In a second step, the collective probabilities for all other events are assigned. For example, the collective probability of 'rain and heat'might be de…ned as a suitable function of the collective probability of 'rain', the collective probability of 'heat', and an estimated rain/heat-correlation coe¢ cient, which could be the result of aggregating the rain/heat-correlation coe¢ cients encoded in the individual probability functions.
This proposal can be expressed more precisely by a single axiom, which does not require the (inessential) sequential implementation just sketched, but focuses instead on a core informational restriction: the collective probability of any 'premise' (basic event) should depend solely on the individual probabilities for this premise, not on individual probabilities for other events. We call this axiom independence on premises. Our axiomatic treatment of premise-based aggregation is inspired by binary judgment-aggregation theory, where the premise-based approach has also been characterized by a restricted independence axiom; see, for instance, Dietrich (2006) , Mongin (2008) , and Dietrich and Mongin (2010) . For less formal discussions of premise-based aggregation, see Kornhauser and Sager (1986) , Pettit (2001) , List and Pettit (2002) , and List (2006) .
The way in which we have just motivated the premise-based approach and the corresponding axiom is bound to raise some questions. For example, although the distinction between 'basic'events and 'non-basic'events is arguably not ad hoc, there is no purely formal criterion for drawing that distinction.
3 However, there 3 Indeed, one could construct ('derive') basic events from non-basic events, using the operations of negation and disjunction. Formally, while the basic events typically form a generating system of the -algebra, there exist many alternative generating systems, and usually none of them is canonical in a technical sense. The task of determining the 'basic' events therefore involves some interpretation and may be context-dependent and open to disagreement. One might, however, employ a syntactic criterion which counts an event as 'basic' if, in a suitable language (perhaps one deemed 'natural'), it can be expressed by an atomic sentence (one that is not a combination of other sentences using Boolean connectives). An event expressible by the sentence 'it will rain or it will snow'would then count as non-basic. This syntactic criterion relies on our choice of language, which, though not a purely technical matter, is arguably not ad hoc. An n-place connective (e.g., the two-place connective 'or') is called Boolean or truth-functional if the truth-value of every sentence constructed by applying this connective to n other sentences is determined by the truth values of the latter sentences. For instance, 'or'is Boolean since 'p or q'is true if and only if 'p'is true or 'q'is true. Many languages, especially ones mimic natural language, contain non-Boolean connectives, for instance non-material conditionals for which the truth-value of 'if p then q'is not always determined by the truth-values of p and q. When the sentence 'if p then q'is not truth-functionally decomposable, an event represented by it would count as 'basic'under the present syntactic criterion. The sentence 'CO 2 emissions cause global warming'can be viewed as a non-material (speci…cally, causal) conditional 'if p then q', hence would describe a basic event. See Priest (2001) for an introduction to non-classical logic.
is another, less controversial motivation for the premise-based approach. Our central axiom -independence on premises -privileges particular events, called the 'premises'. We have so far interpreted these quite speci…cally, taking them to correspond to basic events and to constitute the premises in an individual's probability-assignment process. But we can give up this speci…c interpretation and de…ne a 'premise' simply as an event for which it is desirable that the collective probability depend solely on the event-speci…c individual probabilities. If 'premises'are de…ned like this, then our axiom -independence on premises -is justi…ed by de…nition (though of course we can no longer o¤er any guidance as to which events should count as premises). The terminology 'premise'is still justi…ed, though not in the sense of 'premise of individual probability assignment' (since we no longer assume that premises are basic in the individuals' formation of probabilistic beliefs), but in the sense of 'premise of collective probability assignment'(because the collective probabilities for these events are determined independently of the probabilities of other events and then constrain other collective probabilities).
We show that premise-based opinion pooling imposes signi…cant restrictions on how the collective probabilities of the premises can be determined. At the same time, these restrictions are not undesirable; they do not lead to 'undemocratic'or 'degenerate'forms of opinion pooling. Speci…cally, as soon as there are certain logical interconnections between the premises, independence on premises, together with a unanimity-preservation requirement, implies that the collective probability for each premise is a (possibly weighted) linear average of the individual probabilities for that premise, where the vector of weights across di¤erent individuals is the same for each premise. We present several variants of this result, which di¤er in the precise nature of the unanimity-preservation requirement and in the kinds of interconnections that are assumed between premises. In some variants, we do not obtain the 'linearity'conclusion, but only a weaker 'neutrality' conclusion: the collective probability for each premise must be a (possibly non-linear) function of the individual probabilities for that premise, where this function is the same for each premise. These results are structurally similar to those in our companion paper, though interpretationally di¤erent (Dietrich and List 2013b). Furthermore, our results stand in contrast with existing results on the premise-based approach in binary judgment aggregation. When judgments are binary, independence on premises leads to dictatorial aggregation under analogous conditions (see especially Dietrich and Mongin 2010).
Our results apply regardless of which events are deemed to serve as premises. In the extreme case in which all events count as premises, the requirement of independence on premises reduces to the familiar event-wise independence axiom (sometimes called the strong setwise function property), and our results reduce to a classic characterization of linear pooling (see Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981; see also Wagner 1982 and 1985; Aczél, Ng and Wagner 1984; Genest 1984a , Mongin 1995 and Chambers 2007) . 4 
The framework
We consider a group of n 2 individuals, labelled i = 1; :::; n, who have to assign collective probabilities to some events.
The agenda: a -algebra of events. We consider a non-empty set of possible worlds (or states). An event is a subset A of ; its complement ('negation') is denoted A c := nA. The set of events to which probabilities are to be assigned is called the agenda. We assume that it is a -algebra, 2 , i.e., a set of events that is closed under complementation and countable union (and by implication also countable intersection). The simplest non-trivial example of a -algebra is of the form = fA; A c ; ; ?g, in which A might be the event that it will rain. Another example is the set 2 of all events; this is a commonly studied -algebra when is …nite or countably in…nite. A third example is the -algebra of Borel-measurable sets when = R.
An example. Let us give an example similar to the lead example in our companion paper (Dietrich and List 2013b), except that we now take the agenda to be a -algebra. Let the set of possible worlds be the set of vectors f0; 1g 3 nf(1; 1; 0)g with the following interpretation. The …rst component of each vector indicates whether atmospheric CO 2 is above some critical threshold (1 = 'yes' and 0 = 'no'), the second component indicates whether there is a mechanism to the effect that if atmospheric CO 2 is above that threshold, then Arctic summers are ice-free, and the third component indicates whether Arctic summers are ice-free. The triple (1; 1; 0) is excluded from because it would represent an inconsistent combination of characteristics. An expert committee may well be faced with an opinion pooling problem on the agenda = 2 .
The opinions: probability functions. In the present framework, opinions are represented by probability functions on (the agenda). Formally, a probability function on is a function P : ! [0; 1] such that P ( ) = 1 and P is -additive (i.e., P (A 1 [ A 2 [ :::) = P (A 1 ) + P (A 2 ) + ::: for every sequence of pairwise disjoint events A 1 ; A 2 ; ::: 2 ). We write P to denote the set of all probability functions on . 4 Historically, linear pooling goes back at least to Stone (1961) . Linear pooling is by no means the only plausible way to aggregate subjective probabilities. Other approaches include geometric and, more generally, externally Bayesian pooling (e.g., McConway 1978 , Genest 1984b and Genest, McConway and Schervish 1986 , multiplicative pooling (Dietrich 2010), supra-Bayesian pooling (e.g., Morris 1974) , and pooling of ordinal probabilities (Weymark 1997) . A useful, though somewhat outdated, literature review is given in Genest and Zidek (1986) .
Opinion pooling. Given the agenda , a combination of probability functions across the individuals, (P 1 ; :::; P n ), is called a pro…le (of probability functions). An (opinion) pooling function is a function F : P n ! P , which assigns to each pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) a collective probability function P = F (P 1 ; :::; P n ), also denoted P P 1 ;:::;Pn . An example of P P 1 ;:::;Pn is the arithmetic average 1 n P 1 + :::
Some logical terminology. We conclude this section with some further terminology. Events distinct from ? and are called contingent. A set S of events is consistent if its intersection \ A2S A is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise; S entails an event B if the intersection of S is included in B (i.e., \ A2S A B).
3 Axiomatic requirements on ' premise-based' opinion pooling
We now introduce the axioms that we require a premise-based opinion pooling function to satisfy.
Independence on premises
Before we introduce our new axiom of independence on premises, let us recall the familiar requirement of (event-wise) independence. It requires that the collective probability for any event depend only on the individual probabilities for that event, independently of the probabilities of other events.
Independence. For each event A 2 , there exists a function D A : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)):
This requirement can be criticized -in the classical framework where the agenda is a -algebra -for being normatively unattractive. Typically only some of the events in the -algebra correspond to intuitively basic propositions such as 'the economy will grow' or 'atmospheric CO 2 causes global warming'. Other events in are combinations of basic events, such as 'the economy will grow or atmospheric CO 2 causes global warming'. The non-basic events can get enormously complicated: they can be conjunctions of (…nitely or countably in…nitely many) basic events, or disjunctions, or disjunctions of conjunctions, and so on. It seems natural to privilege the basic events over the other, more 'arti…cial'events by replacing the independence requirement with a restricted independence requirement that quanti…es only over basic events. Indeed, it seems implausible to apply independence to composite events such as 'the economy will grow or atmospheric CO 2 causes global warming', since this would prevent us from using the probabilities of each of the constituent events in determining the overall probability.
By restricting the independence requirement to basic events alone, we e¤ec-tively treat these as premises in the collective probability-assignment process, …rst aggregating individual probabilities for basic events and then letting the resulting collective probabilities constrain the collective probabilities of all other events. (The probabilities of the premises constrain those other probabilities because the probability assignments in their entirety must be coherent, i.e., constitute a wellde…ned probability function.)
Formally, consider a sub-agenda of , denoted X, which we interpret as containing the basic events, called the premises. By a sub-agenda we mean a subset of which is non-empty and closed under complementation (i.e., it forms an 'agenda'in the generalized sense discussed in our companion paper, Dietrich and List 2013b). We introduce the following axiom:
Independence on X (' on premises' ). For each A 2 X, there exists a function
n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)):
In the climate-change example of Section 2, the sub-agenda of premises might be de…ned as X = fA 1 ; A c 1 ; A 2 ; A c 2 ; A 3 ; A c 3 g, where A 1 is the event that atmospheric CO 2 is above the critical threshold, A 2 is the event that there is a mechanisms by which CO 2 concentrations above the threshold cause ice-free Arctic summers, and A 3 is the event of ice-free Arctic summers. Note, for example, that conjunctions such as A 1 \ A 2 are not included in the set X of premises here. As a result, independence on X allows the collective probability for any such conjunction to depend not only on the experts' probabilities for that conjunction, but also, for instance, on their probabilities for the underlying conjuncts (together with auxiliary assumptions about correlations between them).
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We have explained why event-wise independence should not be required for non-basic events. But why should we require it for basic events (premises)? We o¤er three reasons:
First, if we accept the idea that an individual's probabilistic belief about a given premise is not in ‡uenced by, but might in ‡uence, his or her probabilistic beliefs about other events, then we are led to regard those other beliefs as by-products of, or unrelated to, the individual's belief about the premise in question. It then seems reasonable to treat those other beliefs as irrelevant to the question of what probability should be collectively assigned to that premise. (More precisely, any beliefs about other events provide no relevant additional information once the individual's belief about the premise is given.) Second, the premise-based approach can be motivated by appealing to the idea of a 'rational collective agent' that forms its probabilistic beliefs by reasoning from premises to conclusions. This kind of collective reasoning can be implemented by …rst aggregating the probabilities for the premises and then letting these constrain the probabilities assigned to other events. In the case of binary judgment aggregation, Pettit (2001) has described this process as the 'collectivization of reason'. Third, as mentioned in the introduction, one might simply de…ne the premises as the events for which it is desirable that the collective probabilities depend solely on the event-speci…c individual probabilities. This would render the requirement of independence on premises justi…ed by de…nition.
Consensus preservation on premises
Informally, our second requirement on premise-based opinion pooling says that whenever there is unanimous agreement among the individuals about the probability of certain events, this agreement should be preserved collectively. We distinguish between di¤erent versions of this requirement. The most familiar one is the following:
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if, for all i, P i (A) = 1, then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
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A second, less demanding version of the requirement is restricted to events in the sub-agenda X of premises.
Consensus preservation on X (' on premises' ). For all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if, for all i, P i (A) = 1, then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
Restricting consensus preservation in this way may be plausible because a consensus on any event outside X may be considered less compelling than a consensus on a premise in X, for reasons similar to those for which we restricted event-wise independence to premises. A consensus on a non-basic event could be 'spurious'in the sense that there might not be any agreement on its basis (see Mongin 2005) . 6 Equivalently, one can demand the preservation of the unanimous assignment of probability 0.
7 In our companion paper (Dietrich and List 2013b), we make the opposite move of extend-We also consider a third version of consensus preservation, which is still restricted to premises, but refers to conditional probabilities. It says that if all individuals assign a conditional probability of 1 to some premise given another, then this should be preserved collectively.
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Conditional consensus preservation on X (' on premises' ). For all A; B 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if, for all i, P i (AjB) = 1 (provided P i (B) 6 = 0), then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (AjB) = 1 (provided P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) 6 = 0).
Conditional consensus preservation on X is equivalent to another requirement. This says that if all individuals agree that some premise implies another with probabilistic certainty (i.e., the probability of the …rst event occurring without the second is zero), then that agreement should be preserved collectively.
Implication preservation on X (' on premises' ). For all events A; B 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , if, for all i, P i (AnB) = 0, then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (AnB) = 0.
The equivalence between conditional consensus preservation on X and implication preservation on X follows from the fact that the clause 'P i (AjB) = 1 (provided P i (B) 6 = 0)' is equivalent to 'P i (BnA) = 0', and the clause 'P P 1 ;:::;Pn (AjB) = 1 (provided P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) 6 = 0)'is equivalent to 'P P 1 ;:::;Pn (BnA) = 0'. Thus the statement of conditional consensus preservation on X can be reduced to that of implication preservation on X (except that the roles of A and B are swapped).
This equivalence also illuminates the relationship between conditional consensus preservation on X and consensus preservation on X, because the former, re-formulated as implication preservation on X, clearly implies the latter. Simply note that, in the statement of implication preservation on X, taking B = A c yields P (AnB) = P (A), so that a unanimous zero probability of any event A in X must be preserved, which is equivalent to consensus preservation on X.
In fact, conditional consensus preservation on X, when re-formulated as implication preservation on X, is also easily seen to be equivalent to a further unanimity-preservation requirement, which refers to unanimous assignments of probability 1 to a union of two events in X (just note that AnB has probability 0 if and only if A c [B has probability 1). This also shows that conditional consensus preservation on X is logically weaker than consensus preservation in its original form (on all of ), since it does not require preservation of unanimous assignments ing consensus preservation to events outside the agenda. More precisely, we extend consensus preservation to events constructible from events in the agenda using the standard operations of conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union), or negation (complementation). In the present paper, there is no point in trying to extend consensus preservation to other events, since there are no events outside the agenda constructible from events in it (the agenda is a -algebra and is therefore closed under the relevant operations). 8 We are indebted to Richard Bradley for suggesting this formulation of the requirement.
of probability 1 to intersections of two events in X, or unions or intersections of more than two events in X.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between the different consensus-preservation requirements (in part (a)) and adds another simple but useful observation (in part (b)).
Proposition 1 (a) For any sub-agenda X of , conditional consensus preservation on X implies consensus preservation on X; is implied by (global) consensus preservation; is equivalent to implication preservation on X, and to each of the following two requirements:
= 1] ) P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A[B) = 1, for all A; B 2 X, P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P ; [8i P i (A\B) = 0] ) P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A\B) = 0, for all A; B 2 X, P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P . (b) For the maximal sub-agenda X = , all of these requirements are equivalent.
A class of applications
So far, all our examples of opinion pooling problems have involved events corresponding to propositions in natural language, such as 'it will rain'. As argued in our companion paper (Dietrich and List 2013b), in such applications the classical assumption that the agenda is a -algebra (which we have retained here) is often unnatural.
However, there is a second class of applications, in which it is more natural to de…ne the agenda as a -algebra, , and to restrict the independence requirement to some sub-agenda X. Suppose we wish to estimate the distribution of a realvalued or vector-valued variable, such as rainfall or the number of insurance claims in a particular period. Here, the set of worlds could be R, Z, N, or f0; 1; :::; mg, or it could be R k , Z k , N k , or f0; 1; :::; mg k (for natural numbers m and k). In such cases, the focus on the -algebra of events seems more realistic. First, we may need a full probability distribution on that -algebra. Second, individuals may be able to come up with such a probability distribution, because, in practice, they can do the following: …rst choose some parametric class of probability functions (e.g., the class of Gaussian distributions if = R, Poisson distributions if = N, or binomial distributions if = f0; 1; :::; mg); then estimate the relevant parameter(s) of the distribution (e.g., the mean and standard deviation in the case of a Gaussian distribution).
Because the agenda in this kind of application (e.g., the -algebra of Borel sets over R, or the power set of N) contains very complicated events, it would be implausible to require event-wise independent aggregation for all such events.
For instance, suppose = R, and consider the event that a number's distance to the nearest prime exceeds 37. It would seem arti…cial to determine the collective probability for that event without paying attention to the probabilities of other events. Here, the sub-agenda X on which event-wise independence is plausible is likely to be much smaller than the full -algebra .
Let us summarize how such applications di¤er from the above mentioned applications involving events that correspond to natural-language propositions such as 'it will rain'or 'atmospheric CO 2 causes global warming':
( 1) is a subset of R or of a higher-dimensional Euclidean space R k , rather than a set of 'possible worlds'speci…ed by natural-language descriptions; (2) it is often natural to arrive at a probability function by choosing a parametric family of such functions (such as the family of Gaussian distributions) and then specifying the relevant parameter(s), while this approach would seem ad hoc in the other kind of application; (3) in practice, we may be interested in a probability function on the entire -algebra (e.g., in order to compute the mean of the distribution and other moments), rather than just in the probabilities of speci…c events.
When is opinion pooling neutral on premises?
We now show that, once there are certain interconnections between the premises in X, any pooling function satisfying independence on X and consensus preservation in one of the senses we have introduced must be neutral on X. This means that the pattern of dependence between individual and collective probability assignments is the same for all premises. In the next section, we turn to the question of whether our axioms imply linear pooling on premises, over and above neutrality. n ! [0; 1] -the local pooling criterion for events in X -such that, for every pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n , the collective probability of any event A in X is given by P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D(P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)):
If X = , neutrality on X reduces to neutrality in the familiar global sense, brie ‡y mentioned in the introduction.
Our …rst result uses the strongest consensus-preservation requirement we have introduced, namely 'global'consensus preservation (on all of ). Here, we obtain the neutrality conclusion as soon as the sub-agenda of premises satis…es a very mild condition: it is 'non-nested'. We call a sub-agenda X nested if it has the form X = fA; A c : A 2 X + g for some set of events X + which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and non-nested otherwise. For instance, X = fA; A c g is nested (take X + := fAg), as is X = fA; A c ; A\B; (A\B) c g (take X + = fA; A\Bg). By contrast, X = fA; A c ; B; B c g is non-nested when the events A and B are logically independent. Also, the above-mentioned sub-agenda X = fA 1 ; A c 1 ; A 2 ; A c 2 ; A 3 ; A c 3 g in our climate-change example is non-nested. Further examples are given in our companion paper (Dietrich and List 2013b).
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested (…nite 9 ) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation is neutral on X. (b) For any nested sub-agenda X of the -algebra (where X is …nite and distinct from f?; g), there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation that is not neutral on X.
The result continues to hold if we weaken consensus preservation to conditional consensus preservation on premises:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X is neutral on X. (b) For any nested sub-agenda X of the -algebra (where X is …nite and not f?; g), there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X that is not neutral on X.
However, if we weaken the consensus-preservation requirement further -namely to consensus preservation on X -then the neutrality conclusion follows only if the events within the sub-agenda X exhibit stronger interconnections. Speci…cally, the set X must be 'path-connected', as originally de…ned in binary judgmentaggregation theory (often under the name 'total blockedness'; see Nehring and Puppe 2010) . To de…ned path-connectedness formally, we begin with a preliminary notion. Given the sub-agenda X, we say that an event A 2 X conditionally entails another event B 2 X -written We call the sub-agenda X path-connected if any two events A; B 2 Xnf?; g can beconnected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events A 1 ; :::; A k 2 X (k 1) such that A = A 1` A 2` :::` A k = B, and non-path-connected otherwise. For example, suppose X = fA; A c ; B; B c ; C; C c g, where fA; B; Cg is a partition of (and A; B; C 6 = ?). Then X is pathconnected. For instance, to see that there is a path from A to B, note that A` C c (take Y = ?) and C c` B (take Y = fA c g). Many sub-agendas are not path-connected, including all nested sub-agendas X (6 = f?; g) and the subagenda X = fA 1 ; A Theorem 3 (a) For any path-connected (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and consensus preservation on X is neutral on X. (b) For any non-path-connected (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and consensus preservation on X that is not neutral on X.
When is opinion pooling linear on premises?
Our next question is whether, and for which sub-agendas X, our requirements on an opinion pooling function imply linearity on premises, over and above neutrality. Formally, a pooling function for agenda is called linear on X ( ) if there exist real-valued weights w 1 ; :::; w n 0 with w 1 + ::: + w n = 1 such that, for every pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n , the collective probability of any event A in X is given by
If X = , linearity on X reduces to linearity in the global sense, familiar from the established literature.
As in the case of neutrality, whether our axioms imply linearity on a given sub-agenda X depends on how the events in X are interconnected and which consensus-preservation requirement we impose on the pooling function. Again, our …rst result uses the strongest consensus-preservation requirement and applies to a very large class of sub-agendas.
Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra with jXnf ; ?gj > 4, every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation is linear on X.
(b) For any other sub-agenda X of the -algebra (where X is …nite and distinct from f?; g), there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and (global) consensus preservation that is not linear on X.
If we weaken consensus preservation to conditional consensus preservation on X, the linearity conclusion still follows, but only if the sub-agenda X is 'nonsimple' -a condition stronger than non-nestedness, but still weaker than pathconnectedness. 11 The notion of non-simplicity also comes from binary judgmentaggregation theory, where the non-simple agendas are those that are susceptible to majority inconsistencies, the judgment-aggregation analogues of Condorcet's paradox (e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2010, Dietrich and List 2007) . Formally, a subagenda X is non-simple if it has a minimal inconsistent subset Y X of more than two (but not uncountably many) events, and simple otherwise. (A set Y is minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but all its proper subsets are consistent.) For example, the sub-agenda X = fA 1 ; A Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X is linear on X.
(b) For any simple sub-agenda X of the -algebra (where X is …nite and distinct from f?; g), there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and conditional consensus preservation on X that is not linear on X.
Finally, if we impose only the weakest of our three consensus-preservation requirements -consensus preservation on X -then the linearity conclusion follows only if the sub-agenda X is path-connected and satis…es an additional condition. A su¢ cient such condition is 'partitionality'. A sub-agenda X is partitional if some subset Y X partitions into at least three non-empty events (where Y is …nite or countably in…nite), and non-partitional otherwise. As an illustration, recall our earlier example of a sub-agenda given by X = fA; A c ; B; B c ; C; C c g, where fA; B; Cg partitions (with A; B; C 6 = ?). This sub-agenda is both pathconnected (as mentioned above) and partitional.
Theorem 6 (a) For any path-connected and partitional (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , every pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and consensus preservation on X is linear on X. (b) For any non-pathconnected (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X and consensus preservation on X that is not linear on X.
It is clear from part (b) that path-connectedness of the premises is necessary for the linearity conclusion to follow. The other condition, partitionality, is not necessary. But it is not redundant:
Proposition 2 For some path-connected and non-partitional (…nite) sub-agenda X of the -algebra , there exists a pooling function F : P n ! P satisfying independence on X (even neutrality on X) and consensus preservation on X that is not linear on X.
12
7 Classical results as special cases
As should be evident, if we apply our results to the maximal sub-agenda X = , we obtain classic results (by Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981) as special cases. To see why this is the case, we note three things. First, when X = , our various conditions on the sub-agenda X all reduce to a single condition on the size of the -algebra .
Lemma 1 For the maximal sub-agenda X = (where 6 = f ; ?g), the conditions of non-nestedness, non-simplicity, path-connectedness, and partitionality are all equivalent, and they all hold if and only if j j > 4, i.e., if and only if is not of the form fA; A c ; ; ?g.
Second, when X = , independence, neutrality, and linearity on X reduce to independence, neutrality, and linearity in the familiar 'global' sense, as already noted. Third, our various consensus-preservation requirements all become equivalent, by Proposition 1.
In consequence, our six theorems reduce to two classic results:
13 Theorems 1 to 3 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying independence and consensus preservation are neutral if jXj > 4, but not if jXj = 4; Theorems 4 to 6 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying independence and consensus preservation are linear if jXj > 4, but not if jXj = 4.
(The case j j < 4 is uninteresting because it means that is the trivialalgebra f ; ?g.) Let us slightly re-formulate these two results:
Corollary 1 For the -algebra , (a) if jXj > 4, every pooling function F : P n X ! P X satisfying independence and consensus preservation is linear (and by implication neutral); (b) if jXj = 4, there exists a pooling function F : P n X ! P X satisfying independence and consensus preservation that is not neutral (and by implication not linear).
12 This assumes that the agenda is not very small, i.e., contains more than 2 3 = 8 events (e.g., = 2 with j j > 3). Note that, as is a -algebra, it has the size 2 k for some k 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g or is in…nite. 13 We require no restriction to a …nite , as observed in footnote 9.
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This appendix contains all proofs. Since our results are mathematically related to those in the companion paper (Dietrich and List 2013b), some parts of the present results (notably, parts (a) of each theorem) will not be proved directly but reduced to results in the companion paper.
In Section A.1 we prove some lemmas which will help us translate between our results and those in the companion paper. Section A.2 contains the proof of Theorem 1, Section A.3 that of Theorems 2, and so on until Section A.7. Finally, Section A.8 contains the proof of Proposition 2.
A.1 The relationship to opinion pooling on general agendas
We now relate premise-based opinion pooling to opinion pooling on a general agenda as introduced in the companion paper. We start by generalizing the framework to arbitrary agendas. In general, an agenda is a non-empty set X of events of the form A which is closed under complementation (i.e., A 2 X ) A c 2 X). Interpretationally, X contains the events on which opinions are formed. It need not be closed under disjunction (union) or conjunction (intersection) of two events, and thus need not take the classical form of a -algebra. Examples are given in the companion paper.
Given an agenda X, an opinion function is a function P : X ! [0; 1] which is coherent, i.e., extendible to a probability function on the -algebra (X) generated by X (i.e., the smallest -algebra which includes X, constructible by closing X under countable unions and complements). Let P X be the set of all opinion functions for agenda X. Note that if X happens to be a -algebra, P X consists of all probability functions on X, in line with the notation used above. An opinion pooling function for agenda X is a function P n X ! P X assigning to each pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) of individual opinion functions a collective opinion function, typically denoted P P 1 ;:::;Pn . We call the pooling function linear and neutral, respectively, if it is linear and neutral on X in line with the de…nition above.
Crucially, a pooling function for a -algebra induces new pooling functions for any sub-agendas X on which it is independent. Formally, a pooling function F : P n ! P for agenda is said to induce the pooling function F 0 : P n X ! P X for (sub-)agenda X if F and F 0 generate the same collective opinions within X, i.e., F 0 (P 1 j X ; :::; P n j X ) = F (P 1 ; :::; P n )j X for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P (and if, in addition, P X = fP j X : P 2 P g, where this addition holds automatically whenever X is …nite or (X) = 14 ). Our axiomatic requirements on a pooling function for agenda -i.e., independence on a sub-agenda X and various consensus requirements -should be compared with the following requirements on a pooling function for the agenda X (introduced and discussed in the companion paper). The …rst two requirements are unrestricted versions of independence and consensus preservation:
Independence. For each event A 2 X, there exists a function D A : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D A (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)).
Consensus preservation. For all A 2 X and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if P i (A) = 1 for all individuals i then P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
The next two requirements are two di¤erent extensions of consensus preservation, namely to either implicitly revealed or unrevealed beliefs. An individual i's implicitly revealed beliefs are given by any probabilities of events in (X)nX which are 'implied'by the explicitly revealed beliefs, i.e., by the submitted opinion function P i : they hold under every extension of P i to a probability function on (X). For instance, if P i assigns probability 1 to an event A 2 X, then the agent implicitly reveals certainty of events B A outside X. The following axiom extends consensus preservation to implicitly revealed beliefs: Implicit consensus preservation. For all A 2 (X) and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if each P i implies certainty of A (i.e., P i (A) = 1 for every extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X)), then so does P P 1 ;:::;Pn . By contrast, individual i's unrevealed beliefs are any probabilistic beliefs which the agent privately holds relative to events in (X)nX, and which are inaccessible based on the submitted opinion function P i because di¤erent extensions of P i to a probability function on (X) assign di¤erent probabilities to the events in question. The following axiom requires the collective opinion function to be compatible with any unanimously held certainty of an event -including any unrevealed certainty, which is not implied by the submitted opinion functions but is consistent with them. This ensures that no (possibly unrevealed) consensus is ever overruled.
Consensus compatibility. For all A 2 (X) and all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , if each P i is consistent with certainty of A (i.e., P i (A) = 1 for some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X)), then so is P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
A …nal requirement pertains to conditional beliefs. Note that, based on an individual i's opinion function P i , the conditional belief P i (AjB) = P i (A\B)=P i (B) of one agenda event A given another B (where P i (B) 6 = 0) is typically unde…ned, since typically A \ B 6 2 X, so that P i (A \ B) is unde…ned. Hence, if the agent happens to be certain of A given B, then this conditional certainty is typically unrevealed. Our axiom of conditional consensus compatibility requires that any (possibly unrevealed) unanimous conditional certainty should not be overruled. In fact, we require something subtly stronger: any set of (possibly unrevealed) unanimous conditional certainties should not be overruled (see the companion paper for details).
Conditional consensus compatibility. For all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P X , and all …nite sets S of pairs (A; B) of events in X, if every opinion function P i is consistent with certainty of A given B for all (A; B) in S (i.e., some extension P i of P i to a probability function on (X) satis…es P i (AjB) = 1 for all pairs (A; B) 2 S such that P i (B) 6 = 0), then so is the collective opinion function P P 1 ;:::;Pn .
The following lemma shows how properties of a pooling function for aalgebra translate into corresponding properties of an induced pooling function for a sub-agenda.
Lemma 2 Suppose pooling function F for -algebra induces pooling function F 0 for sub-agenda X (where X is …nite or (X) = ). Then: F 0 is independent (respectively neutral, linear) if and only if F is independent (respectively neutral, linear) on X, F 0 is consensus-preserving if and only if F is consensus-preserving on X, F 0 is consensus-compatible if F is consensus-preserving, F 0 is conditional-consensus-compatible if F is conditional-consensus-preserving on X.
This lemma follows from a more general result proved in the companion paper:
Lemma 3 Consider a -algebra and a sub-agenda X (where X is …nite or (X) = ). Any pooling function for X is (a) induced by some pooling function for agenda , (b) independent (respectively neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda is independent (respectively neutral, linear) on X, where 'every'can be replaced by 'some', (c) consensus-preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda is consensus-preserving on X, where 'every'can be replaced by 'some', (d) consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda is consensus-preserving, (e) conditional-consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda is conditional-consensus-preserving on X (where in (d) and (e) the 'only if'claim assumes that X is …nite).
We …nally note a simple su¢ cient condition for when a given pooling function induces a new one for a sub-agenda (see the companion paper for the simple proof):
Lemma 4 If a pooling function for a -algebra is independent on a sub-agenda X (where X is …nite or (X) = ), then it induces a pooling function for agenda X.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We draw on a measure-theoretic fact (proved in the companion paper):
Lemma 5 Every probability function on a …nite sub--algebra of -algebra can be extended to a probability function on .
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) We reduce this part to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a). Let X be a non-nested …nite sub-agenda of the -algebra agenda . Suppose F : P n ! P is independent on X and (globally) consensus preserving. By independence on X (and …niteness of X), F induces a pooling function F 0 for agenda X (see Lemma 4). Now F 0 is independent and consensus-compatible (by Lemma 2), hence neutral by the companion paper's Theorem 1(a). So F is neutral on X (see Lemma 2).
(b) Consider a …nite nested sub-agenda X 6 = f?; g of the -algebra agenda . (As will become clear, the …niteness assumption could be replaced by the assumption that (X) = . Under this alternative assumption, the 'Claim'below can be skipped, and the rest of the proof remains almost una¤ected.) We construct a pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn for agenda with the relevant properties. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that ?; 2 X. We start by establishing the following fact:
Claim. If Theorem 1(b) holds in the case that (X) = , then it holds in general.
Indeed, suppose Theorem 1(b) holds in the special case. Let 0 := (X) ( ). By assumption, there exists a pooling function F 0 : P n 0 ! P 0 with the relevant properties. Let A be the set of atoms of the (…nite) -algebra 0 . We de…ne a pooling function F : P n ! P as follows. Consider P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P and let P 0 := F 0 (P 1 j 0 ; :::; P n j 0 ). For each A 2 A such that P 0 (A) 6 = 0 there is an individual i A such that P i A (A) 6 = 0, since otherwise all individuals assign a probability of one to nA while P 0 ( nA) 6 = 1, a contradiction as F 0 is consensuspreserving. By Lemma 5, P 0 can be extended to a probability function P on . It is clear from that lemma's proof (given in the companion paper) that we may assume without loss of generality that P ( jA) = P i A ( jA) for each A 2 A such that P (A) 6 = 0:
(In that proof, it su¢ ces to choose the Q A 's appropriately, since each Q A equals P ( jA) provided P (A) 6 = 0.) We de…ne F (P 1 ; :::; P n ) to be this P . It remains to show that the just-de…ned pooling function F inherits all relevant properties from F 0 . This is obvious for the properties of independence on X and non-neutrality on X. To show that F is (globally) consensus-preserving, consider any B 2 and any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P such that P 1 (B) = = P n (B) = 1. We have to show that P (B) = 1, where P := F (P 1 ; :::; P n ). Note …rst that
Here (in the notation above) each P (BjA) equals P i A (BjA), which, in turn, equals 1 because P i A (B) = 1. So
This proves the claim.
By the previous 'Claim', we may assume without loss of generality that (X) = . As X is nested, we may write it as X = fA; A c : A 2 X + g for a subset X + X which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and which contains both ? and .
As an ingredient to our construction, we consider any pooling function for agenda which is neutral (at least) on X and consensus-preserving and whose pooling criterion on X, denoted D : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1], is at least weakly increasing in each argument. (For instance we might use dictatorship by individual 1, given by (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P 1 , with pooling criterion given by D(t 1 ; :::; t n ) = t 1 .) As X 6 = f?; g, there is a contingent event A 2 X. As A is contingent, there are P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P which all assign probability 1=2 to A (hence to A c ), so that the collective probabilities of A and of A c are each given by D(1=2; :::; 1=2). As these probabilities sum to 1, it follows that D(1=2; 1=2; :::; 1=2) = 1=2:
(1)
We now transform this on X neutral pooling function into a pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn which is non-neutral on X, but still independent on X and consensus-preserving. To do so, we consider a function T :
T is at least weakly increasing, and (iv) T is Lipschitz continuous, i.e., there is a K > 0 such that jT (x) T (y)j K jx yj for all x; y 2 [0; 1]. (For instance, T could be de…ned by T (x) = minf2x; 1g.)
Now consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P . We have to de…ne the collective probability function P P 1 ;:::;Pn . We write P for the result of applying the neutral pooling function to (P 1 ; :::; P n ). To anticipate, our de…nition will imply that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) = T (P (C)) whenever C 2 X + .
As a …rst step towards our de…nition, we de…ne P P 1 ;:::;Pn on the subdomain e X := fA \ B : A; B 2 Xg = fBnA : A; B 2 X + such that A Bg:
The restriction of P P 1 ;:::;Pn to e X, to be denoted g, is de…ned as follows. Each C 2 e X is uniquely representable as C = BnA with A; B 2 X + and A B (and A = B = ? if C = ?), and we de…ne
= T (D(P 1 (B); :::; P n (B))) T (D(P 1 (A); :::; P n (A))).
In particular,
because, …rstly, each C 2 X + can be written as Cn? where C; ? 2 X + , and, secondly, each C 2 XnX + can be written as nC c where ; C c 2 X + and where T (P ( )) = T (1) = 1.
Note that e X is a semi-ring in (since (i) ? 2 e X, (ii) C; C 0 2 e X ) C \C 0 2 e X, and (iii) for all C; C 0 2 e X the di¤erence CnC 0 is a union of …nitely many -in fact, at most two -events in e X). We next show that the function g on this semiring is -additive. First, g is …nitely additive, i.e., for all disjoint C 1 ; C 2 2 e X, if
, as is easily checked using the additivity of P and the de…nition of g. To show -additivity, consider pairwise disjoint C 1 ; C 2 ; ::: 2 e X such that [
We have to show that
For all K 2 f1; 2; :::g, note that the di¤erence
may not belong to e X, but can be partitioned into a …nite set C K of events in e X. Clearly, C K [ fC 1 ; :::;
By carefully inspecting the de…nition of g, one can see that
So, since g(C) KP (C) for each C 2 e X (by the de…nition of g and the property (iv) of T ), we have
(by -additivity of P ), and hence, K ! 0, as required.
Since g is -additive, and of course also -…nite (i.e., is a union of countably many events in e X of …nite g-measure, which is trivially true since 2 e X), Caratheodory's Extension Theorem tells us that g extends uniquely to a measure on ( e X) = (X) = . Let P P 1 ;:::;Pn be this extension. P P 1 ;:::;Pn is indeed a probability measure since, …rstly, g (and hence, P P 1 ;:::;Pn ) is non-negative by the weak increasingness of T , and, secondly, P P 1 ;:::;Pn ( ) = 1 because 2 e X and g( ) = T (1) = 1.
To complete the proof, we must show that the pooling function just de…ned, (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn , is independent on X, (globally) consensus-preserving, but not neutral on X.
Independence on X. This holds because, for all P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , the function P P 1 ;:::;Pn is an extension of a function g which satis…es (2). Notice that the pooling criterion D C for each C 2 X + is de…ned as T D, and the pooling criterion D C for each C 2 CnX + is de…ned by t 7 ! 1 T D(1 t).
Non-neutrality on X. To show non-neutrality on X, it su¢ ces to show that, for some C 2 Xnf ; ?g, the pooling criteria D C and D C c di¤er. (We require that C 6 2 f ; ?g to ensure that the criteria D C and D C c are uniquely determined by the pooling function; the criteria D and D ? are not uniquely determined and could be chosen to di¤er even if the pooling function were neutral on X.) This follows from the following argument. First, Xnf ; ?g 6 = ? since X 6 = f?; g by assumption. So there is a pair C; C c 2 Xnf ; ?g. Without loss of generality, assume C 2 X + and C c 2 XnX + . By the previous proof of independence on X, Consensus preservation. Consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P and any A 2 such that each P i (A) is one. We have to show that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1. Let P be the result of pooling P 1 ; :::; P n using the (at least on X) neutral pooling rule de…ned above. Since that pooling function is consensus-preserving, P (A) = 1. Note further that there is a K > 0 such that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) KP (B) for all B 2 e X (by property (iv) above). Since the ( -additive and -…nite) restrictions P P 1 ;:::;Pn j e X and KP j e X satisfy the inequality P P 1 ;:::;Pn j e X KP j e X , their (by Caratheodory's Extension Theorem uniquely existing) measure extensions on ( e X) = (X) = satisfy the analogous inequality. So, as these extensions are simply P P 1 ;:::;Pn and KP , we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn KP . In particular, P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A c ) KP (A c ) = K(1 P (A)) = K(1 1) = 0, whence P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
(a) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 2(a) via Lemmas 4 and 2, in the same way in which we also reduced Theorem 1(a) to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a).
(b) This part follows immediately from Theorem 1(b), since (global) consensus preservation implies conditional consensus preservation on X by Proposition 1.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
(a) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 3(a) via Lemmas 4 and 2, just as Theorem 1(a) is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a), and Theorem 2(a) to the companion paper's Theorem 2(a).
(b) Now let X be a non-path-connected and …nite sub-agenda of the -algebra . As in the proof of Theorem 1(b), we start by proving that we may assume without loss of generality. that (X) = .
Claim 1. If Theorem 3(b) holds in the case that (X) = , then it holds in general.
Assume Theorem 3(b) holds for the special case and let 0 := (X) ( ). By assumption, there is a F 0 : P n 0 ! P 0 which, on X, is independent and consensus-preserving but not neutral. Consider a pooling function F : P n ! P which, for any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P , generates a probability function in P which extends F 0 (P 1 j 0 ; :::; P n j 0 ) (where such an extension exists by Lemma 5 and the …niteness of 0 ). The so-de…ned pooling function F inherits all relevant properties from F 0 : it is, on X, independent, consensus preserving, and non-neutral. This proves the claim.
Henceforth, let (X) = . Notationally, for any sub--algebra , let A( ) be its set of atoms (i.e., elements of~ nf?g which are minimal with respect to set-inclusion). We now de…ne a pooling function for agenda and show that it has the desired properties. As an ingredient to the de…nition, let
1] be the local pooling criteria of two distinct linear pooling functions; and let A 2 Xnf?; g be a (by assumption existing) event such that not for all A 2 Xnf?; g there is A`` A, where "`` " denotes the transitive closure of` . Consider any pro…le (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 2 P n . To de…ne the probability function P P 1 ;:::;Pn 2 P , we start by de…ning probability functions on two sub--algebras of , denoted 0 and 00 and de…ned as the -algebras generated by the sets X 0 : = fA 2 X : A`` B for both B 2 fA; A c gg,
respectively. Let P 0 P 1 ;:::;Pn 2 P 0 and P 00 P 1 ;:::;Pn 2 P 00 be de…ned by P 0 P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D 0 (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) for all A 2 0 , P 00 P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D 00 (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) for all A 2 00 .
These two functions are indeed probability functions (on 0 resp. 00 ), as they are linear averages of of probability functions. 
As one easily checks, restrictingP P 1 ;:::;Pn to 0 (respectively 00 ) gives P 0 P 1 ;:::;Pn (respectively P 00 P 1 ;:::;Pn ), and sõ P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D 0 (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) for all A 2 0 D 00 (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)) for all A 2 00 .
Before we can extendP P 1 ;:::;Pn to the full -algebra , we …rst prove another claim. For all A 2 X such that A`` A but not A`` A c , de…ne
Claim 3. For all atoms C of~ (= (X 0 [ X 00 )) withP P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) > 0, the event C \ (\ A2X: A`` A and not A`` A c A P 1 ;:::;Pn ) is an atom of .
Let C be as speci…ed, and write C P 1 ;:::;Pn for the event in question. As noted above, C takes the form C = A 0 \ A 00 with A 0 2 A( 0 ) and A 00 2 A( 00 ). By P (C) > 0 and (3), we haveP P 1 ;:::;Pn (A 0 ) > 0 andP P 1 ;:::;Pn (A 00 ) > 0. As A 0 2 A( 0 ), we may write A 0 = \ A2Y 0 A for some set Y 0 X 0 containing exactly one member of each pair A; A c 2 X 0 . Similarly, A 00 = \ A2Y 00 A for some set Y 00 X 00 containing exactly one member of each pair A; A c 2 X 00 . Note also that \ A2X: A`` A and not A`` A c A P 1 ;:::;Pn can be written as \ A2Y P 1 ;:::;Pn A, where the set Y P 1 ;:::;Pn = fA P 1 ;:::;Pn : A 2 X; A`` A; not A`` A c g consists of exactly one member of each pair A; A c 2 Xn(X 0 [X 00 ). 
. As by assumptionP P 1 ;:::;Pn (A 0 ) > 0, there exists by (4 ) at least one i with P i (A 0 ) > 0, hence by (**) with P i (\ B2Y B) > 0. So \ B2Y B 6 = ?, i.e., Y is consistent, a contradiction. Similarly, in the case of (ii) one can show that Y is consistent, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim 3. Now we de…ne P P 1 ;:::;Pn as the unique function on that assigns the following measure to the atoms of . If an atom takes the form given in Claim 3, i.e., the form B = C \ (\ A2X: A`` A and not A`` A c A P 1 ;:::;Pn )
where C 2 A(~ ) andP P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) > 0, then we de…ne the atom's measure as P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) =P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C).
Any other atom has measure de…ned as zero.
Claim 4. P P 1 ;:::;Pn extendsP P 1 ;:::;Pn (in particular, is a probability function).
It su¢ ces to show that P P 1 ;:::;Pn coincides withP P 1 ;:::;Pn on A(~ ). Consider any C 2 A(~ ). As is a re…nement of~ , we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) = X B2A( ):B C P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B):
There are two cases.
Case 1:P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) = 0. Then for all B 2 A( ) with B C we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) = 0 (by de…nition of P P 1 ;:::;Pn ), and so by (5) we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) = 0 =P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C), as desired.
Case 2:P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) > 0. Then, among all atoms B 2 A( ) with B C, there exists (by de…nition of P P 1 ;:::;Pn ) exactly one such that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) > 0 (namely B = C \ (\ A2X: A`` A and not A`` A c A P 1 ;:::;Pn )), and this atom B receives probability P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) =P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C). So by (5) we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C) =P P 1 ;:::;Pn (C). This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 5. For all A 2 X such that A`` A and not A`` A c , P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) is 1 if for some individual i P i (A) > 0, and 0 otherwise.
By de…nition of P P 1 ;:::;Pn , every atom of that has positive probability is a subset of the event \ A2X: A`` A and not A`` A c A P 1 ;:::;Pn , and so this event has probability 1. It follows that, for all A 2 X such that A`` A and not A`` A c , we have P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A P 1 ;:::;Pn ) = 1, and hence P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1 if A P 1 ;:::;Pn = A, i.e., if P i (A) > 0 for some i 0 if A P 1 ;:::;Pn = A c , i.e., if P i (A) = 0 for all i.
This proves Claim 5.
By Claim 4, we have constructed a well-de…ned pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn for agenda . By (4 ) and Claims 5 and 6, we know its behaviour on the entire sub-agenda X: the pooling function is independent on X and the local pooling criterion D A of an event A 2 X is given by These pooling criteria also ensure unanimity preservation on X. To see that pooling is not neutral, it su¢ ces to show that at least two of the four di¤erent types of events (i)-(iv) do indeed occur. This is so because A is of type (i) or (iii) and because by assumption there exists an A 2 X such that not A`` A, i.e., such that A has type (ii) or (iv).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
(a) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 4(a) via Lemmas 4 and 2 (in the way in which we reduced Theorem 1(a) to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a)).
(b) Consider any …nite sub-agenda X 6 = f?; g (of the -algebra agenda ) which is nested or satis…es jXnf?; gj 4. If X is nested, the claim follows from Theorem 1(b), since non-neutrality on X implies non-linearity on X. Now assume the other case, i.e., jXnf?; gj 4. We reduce the claim to the companion paper's Theorem 4(b). By that result, there is a pooling function F 0 for agenda X which is independent, consensus compatible and not linear. By Lemma 3, F 0 is induced by a pooling function for agenda which is independent on X, (globally) consensus-preserving, and not linear on X.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
(a) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 5(a) via Lemmas 4 and 2, again in the way in which (for instance) Theorem 1(a) is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a).
(b) Consider a simple sub-agenda X of -algebra , where X is …nite and not f?; g. We construct a pooling function which, on X, is independent (in fact, neutral) and conditional-consensus-preserving, but not linear. We may assume without loss of generality that (X) = , because the 'Claim' in the proof of Theorem 1(b) (proved using Lemma 5) holds analogously here as well.
As an ingredient to the construction, we use an arbitrary pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P lin P 1 ;:::;Pn which, at least on X, is linear and conditional-consensuspreserving; the rule could be simply given by (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P 1 , which is even globally linear and conditional consensus preserving. We denote by D lin its (uniform) pooling criterion for all events in X. To anticipate, the pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn to be constructed will for each event in X have the pooling 
Consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P . We have to de…ne P P 1 ;:::;Pn . We write collective probabilities under the (at least on X) linear pooling function simply as p(A) := P lin P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) for all A 2 , and de…ne
Notice that for all A 2 X we have A 2 X >1=2 ) A c 6 2 X >1=2 and A 2 X =1=2 , A c 2 X =1=2 .
(Although p(A) and the sets X 1=2 ; X >1=2 ; X =1=2 depend on P 1 ; :::; P n , our notation suppresses P 1 ; :::; P n for simplicity.)
To de…ne P P 1 ;:::;Pn , we …rst need to prove two claims (which use that X is simple). 
Since the intersection of any two of the sets A; B; C has zero p-probability, we have
as p is a probability function. This is a contradiction, since p(A) = p(B) = 1=2 and
. As X is moreover simple, jY j 2, say Y = fA; Bg. As A \ B = ? and p is a probability function, we have
C are atoms of the -algebra , i.e., ( -)minimal elements of nf?g (they are the same atoms if and only if X =1=2 = ?, i.e., if and only if X 1 =1=2 = X 2 =1=2 = ?). To show this, …rst write X as X = fC 0 j ; C 1 j : j = 1; :::; Jg, where J = jXj =2 and where each pair C which k j = k) and is a -algebra (as it is closed under taking unions and complements: just take the unions (respectively complements) of the corresponding sets K f0; 1g J ).
From (7) and the pairwise disjointness of the intersections of the form C We are now in a position to de…ne the function P P 1 ;:::;Pn on . Since \ C2X 1
=1=2
[X >1=2 C and \ C2X 2
[X >1=2
C are non-empty by Claim 1, there exist worlds ! 1 2 \ C2X 1
C and ! 2 2 \ C2X 2
C, where we assume that
[X >1=2 C = \ C2X >1=2 C. (Our notation for worlds again suppresses P 1 ; :::; P n .) Let ! 1 and ! 2 be the corresponding Dirac measures on , given for all A 2 by ! j (A) = 1 if ! j 2 A and ! j (A) = 0 if ! j = 2 A. We de…ne P P 1 ;:::;Pn := 1 2
where ! 1 ; ! 2 of course depend on P 1 ; :::; P n . (So P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) is either 1 or 1/2 or 0, depending on whether A 2 contains both, exactly one, or none of ! 1 and ! 2 ; further, P P 1 ;:::;Pn = ! if ! 1 = ! 2 = !, i.e., if X =1=2 = ?.)
As P P 1 ;:::;Pn is a convex combination of probability functions, P P 1 ;:::;Pn is indeed a probability function. The proof is completed by showing that the so-de…ned pooling function (P 1 ; :::; P n ) 7 ! P P 1 ;:::;Pn has the desired properties, as shown in the next two claims.
Independence on X. We show that the pooling function is neutral on X (hence independent on X) with the pooling criterion D given in (6). To do so, consider any P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P and any A 2 X, and write (t 1 ; :::; t n ) := (P 1 (A); :::; P n (A)). We have to show that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = D(t 1 ; :::; t n ). To do this, we consider three cases, and use p; X >1=2 ; X 1 =1=2 ; X 2 =1=2 ; ! 1 ; ! 2 as de…ned above.
Case 1. p(A) = D lin (t 1 ; :::; t n ) < 1=2. Then D(t 1 ; :::; t n ) = 0. So we must prove that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 0, i.e., that A contains neither ! 1 nor ! 2 . Assume for a contradiction that ! 1 2 A (the proof is analogous if we instead assume ! 2 2 A). Then A includes the set \ C2X 1
C, as this set contains ! If the pooling function were linear on X, the collective probability of A would again be t ( = 2 f0; 1=2; 1g), a contradiction since the collective probability is given by D(t; :::; t) (2 f0; 1=2; 1g), as just shown.
Conditional consensus preservation on X. We consider any A; B 2 X and P 1 ; :::; P n 2 P such that P i (A [ B) = 1 for all i, and show that P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A [ B) = 1; this establishes conditional consensus preservation on X by Proposition 1(a). Hence, with p as de…ned earlier, p(A) 1 p(B), i.e., p(A) + p(B) 1. We distinguish three cases: Case 1. p(A) > 1=2. Then, by the above proof of independence on X, P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A) = 1. So P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A [ B) = 1, as desired.
Case 2. p(B) > 1=2. Then, again by the above proof of independence on X, P P 1 ;:::;Pn (B) = 1. Hence, P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A [ B) = 1, as desired. C, and hence ! 1 2 A and ! 2 2 B. Thus A [ B contains both ! 1 and ! 2 , whence P P 1 ;:::;Pn (A [ B) = 1, as desired.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6. (a) This part is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 6(a) via Lemmas 4 and 2, once again in the way in which, for instance, Theorem 1(a) is reducible to the companion paper's Theorem 1(a).
(b) This part follows from Theorem 3(b) since non-neutrality on X implies non-linearity on X.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the -algebra agenda , of which we assume that j j > 2 3 = 8, i.e., j j 2 4 = 16. Then includes a partition of into four non-empty events. Let X be the sub-agenda consisting of any union of two of these four events. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have constructed a pooling function for agenda X which is neutral and consensus-preserving but not linear. By Lemma 3, this pooling function is induced by a pooling function for agenda which, on X, is neutral and consensus-preserving but not linear.
